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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent submits that this Court should
affirm the District Court's verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the statement of facts
set out by appellant, subject to the following additions.
Although Mrs. Roy Christine Jiron and Frederick Leslie
Palmer's testimony may appear to have been rather insufficient for corroboration of an alleged accomplice's
testimony (Palmer), the testimony of Jan Croxford (T.
158) and MaW'een Iris Callahan (Tr. 163), when coupled
with Christine Jiron's testimony, served to bolster the
corroboration needed to make sufficient Palmer's eyewitness account as a principle to the crime charged.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ADEQUATE CORROBORATING TESTIMONY WAS RECEIVED AT TRIAL TO
CONVICT JIRON OF THE CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY.
Even though Palmer was an alleged accomplice, appellant would have this Court place a much greater burden on the State to corroborate such testimony than is
required by case law as this court has many times stated:

"It is not essential that the corroborative evidence shall be sufficient of itself to support verdict
of guilty, nor is it essential that testimony of the
accomplice be corroborated on every material
point; but it is sufficient if testimony of accomplice
is corroborated as to some material fact, and without aid of testimony of accomplice, tends to connect defendant with the commission of the offense." (Emphasis ours) State v. Vigil, 123 U.
495, 260 P. 2d 539, 541 (1953); State v. Cox, 74 U.
149, 277 P. 972 (1929); State v. Stewart, 57 U. 224,
193 P. 855 (1926); State v. Spencer, 15 U. 149, 49
P. 302 (1899).
Likewise, Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) merely
requires that the corroborative evidence "tend" to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.
(Emphasis ours.) Admittedly, questionable inferences of
Christine Jiron's identification of Larry Jiron's voice
raised valid factual issues for the jury to consider.
However, the testimony of Kenneth L. Duncan, the
store owner, positively identifying Jan Croxford, appellant's girl friend, as having suspiciously entered the store
just prior to the robbery, does more than merely tend to
implicate Larry Jiron, especially when we consider the
fact that after Miss Croxford quizzed the store owner as
to the presence of television sets in his store, and without
waiting for a reply, turned "suspiciously around, giggled,
and walked out the door" (T. 158).
Mr. Duncan in being questioned as to the identity of
Miss Jan Croxford, stated the following:

4

Q.

But absolutely, this is the same girl?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

No questions in your mind at all?

A.

No questions in my mind (T. 158).

*
girl?

Q.

*

*

You recognized her immediately as the

A. I recognized her when we were standing
in the hall; when she caine down the hall.
Q.

This morning (day of trial) ?

A. Yes, sir (T. 159).
In further refuting Larry Jiron's alibi another witness, Maureen Iris Callahan, stated that in the early
morning hours of the 18th of November, 1969, she attempted to visit Jan Croxford and Larry Jiron in the
apartment at which they resided. Although she knocked
"quite awhile," no one caine to the door. The approximate
time was between 1:30 and 3:00 a.m., the alleged time
during which the robbery on the Duncan store was allegedly being committed. (Jiron had alleged in his alibi
having remained all night in Jan Croxford's apartment.)
Therefore, the testimonies of Miss Callal18.ll and Mr.
Duncan, when coupled with that of Mrs. Roy Christine
Jiron, adequately corroborated Frederick Leslie Palmer's
testimony as to the details of the crime. The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) were complied with by the prosecutor for the State.
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POINT II.
PALMER'S TESTIMONY AT TRIAL ADEQUATELY DISPLAYED HIS COMPETENCY
TO TESTIFY TO THE EVENTS WIT NESSED THE NIGHT OF THE ROBBERY.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN OMITTING TESTIMONY
AS TO PALMER'S ALLEGED USE OF
DRUGS OR MENTAL CONDITION.
In refuting the competency of the State's witness,
Palmer, based upon his alleged mental imbalances and
use of drugs, appellant, in contradistinction to prevailing
case law, asserts that one's status as a user of drugs or
certain mental defects, is per se, sufficient criteria for refuting the credibility and competency of the state's witness. Granted there may be times when a person's use of
drugs causes mental defects so serious as to impair his
ability to accurately testify and recall certain facts. Nowhere in the record is there any indication that Palmer's
capacity to recall and reflect on his testimonial facts was
any way impaired by physiological inadequacies.
Relying on the case of State v. Fong Loon, 158 P. 233
(Idaho 1916), appellant Jiron asserts that we should restrict the testimony of drug users. The state submits
however that this case can be adequately distinguished
'
on its facts and is totally inappropos to the case at bar.
In Fong Loon the witness, an alleged opium user, had been
used as a translator to record and convey messages from
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the victim in a shooting incident. The State tried to present the "dying declarations" from the deceased as substantive proof of defendant's guilt. Actually the case involved a "double hearsay" problem based upon the fact
that the deceased had not spoken English. Since his dying
declarations were hearsay, the compounded fact that he
had to be translated by another, the impeached witness,
who later testified as to what was said, caused the testimony to be inadmissible. So much of the case hinged on
the translator's ability to remember, convey, recall and
interpret that a serious question of competency was, of
necessity, mandatorily imposed by the court:
"And we think it was error for the court to
restrict counsel for appellant's attempt to elicit by
cross-examination this information from Yee Wee,
or to lay the foundation for the purpose of establishing by independent proof that Yee Wee was
an habitual user of opium or other like narcotics,
the extent of that use, and what, if any, effect it
had, or was more than likely to have, upon the
mental balance of this witness, the truthfulness of
his testimony, and his capacity to remember and
correctly translate the questions of the representative of the state to Fong Chung into Chinese and
Fong Chung's answers into English." Id. at 236.
The Court in Fong Loon was concerned primarily
with what was said by a hearsay witness now deceased as
conveyed through an addicted interpreter. The case at
bar deals with the witness's first hand account of what
he and defendant did, not as "double hearsay," but as
actual criminal conduct. Regardless of Palmer's use of
drugs or mental incompetencies, unless they affected his
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ability at the time of trial or impaired his ability at the
time of the crime to recollect what happened, none of his
statements should have been excluded.
Appellant would have us apply a very limited series
of cases on evidence to a much broader and less restrictive area of evidential proof on admission of testimony by
state's witnesses. By combining appellant's Points II and
III, the State submits that Palmer's testimony, having
been properly conoborated by three different witnesses,
was clearly admissible and probative of the issues at bar.
Although there is very little case law developed in
Utah as to the competency of a witness determined by
mental capacity or the use of drugs, it does seem fairly
well settled that this State does permit and grant wide
latitude to the trial judge, to, in his discretion, admit or
restrict evidence as a matter of law based on the competency of the witnesses produced.
In ruling on the competency of a six year old child to
testify, the court stated:
"As we have previously observed, no particular
age nor any specific standard of mental ability
can be set as the qualification for giving testimony,
but it is an important factor to be considered along
with others, in determining whether a witness
should be allowed to testify. What is essential is
that it appears that the child has sufficient intelligence and maturity that she is able to understand
the questions put to her; that she has some knowledge of the subject under inquiry and the facts
involved therein; that she is able to remember what
happened; and that she has a sense of moral duty

to tell the truth. Whether she meets those tests

and is therefore a competent witness is within the
sound discretion of the trial court to determine.
His ruling will not be disturbed by the absence of
a clear showing of abuse." (Emphasis ours.) State
v. Smith, 16 U. 2d 374, 377, 401 P. 2d 445 (1965).
In the case of State v. Scott, 22 U. 2d 27, 447 P. 2d
908 (1968), the Court in deciding the competency of a
former state mental patient went on to say:
"A reading of the testimony of the witness
clearly shows that he was competent. Whether or
not he was truthful was for the jury to determine."
Id. at 29.
As in the Smith case, the Scott case uses similar criteria such as the ability to communicate to the jury general intelligence and coherence of testimony, all of which
Palmer displayed by his testimony now on record. The
trial judge had adequate reason to find the witness competent:
"After the trial court is satisfied with the competency of the witness, the final judgment as to
the credibility and weight to be given the testimony is for the jury." Scott, supra at p. 27.
The law in Utah is that evidence which tends to be
highly material to the issues in a dispute is admissible.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1953). In stating who may be
witnesses, the Code states:
"All persons, without exception, otherwise
than as specified in this chapter, who having organs of sense, can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perceptions to others, may be
witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons who

have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor those who have been
convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their
opinions on matters of religious belief; although in
every case the credibility of the witness may be
drawn in question, by the manner in which he
testifies, by the character of his testimony or by
evidence affecting his character for truth, honesty
or integrity, or by his motives, or by contradictory
evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of
his credibility."
The only qualification for witnesses in this Chapter
of the Code is Section 78-24-2 which states that the following persons cannot be witnesses:
" (1) Those who are of unsound mind at the
time of their production for examination." (Emphasis ours.)
A reading of Palmer's testimony obviously supports
his fitness to testify based upon the criteria found in the
Utah Code. Even though Palmer may have used drugs
or been previously unfit emotionally, there was no indication, at least in the jury's mind, that Palmer was unfit to
testify; the jury having been fully informed of the requirements for competency and credibility of witnesses,
through the judge's extensive jury instructions on the
competency issue (Jury Instructions 9-13) .
Expansion of this admissibility of testimony to neighboring jurisdictions, as well as the federal courts, points
up the general consensus that mental competency and use
of drugs does not disqualify a witness per se. In United
States v. Kearney, 420 F. 2d 170 (1969), the court said:
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"All rules as to admissibility of evidence are
subject to supervening considerations that seek to
avoid substantial danger of undue prejudice or
jury confusion. The issue of narcotics use is one
that may be properly handled with some sensitivity
lest it result in undue and unnecessary prejudice.
There is an interest in avoiding undue evidentiary
assault on prosecution witnesses. Davis v. United
States, 133 U. S. App. D. C. 167, 409 F. 2d 453
(1969). Prejudice may result if questions asked
for the limited purpose of testing, say opportunity
to observe, are permitted to generate a hostility
based on the general odium of narcotics use." Id
at 174.
In the case of Herrera v. State, (Ct. of Crim. App.,
Texas), 462 S. W. 2d 598 (1971), the appellant had sought
to attack a witness's competency to testify based upon
the foundation laid that witness had been a narcotics
addict. "There was no showing, however, that at the time
of the hearing or trial or at time of commission of the
alleged offense the witness was under the influence of
narcotics or that her mental capacity or recollection was
impaired to any extent." Id. at 598. In overruling defendant's allegation of the state witness's incompetency by
citing from 97 C. J. S. Witnesses § 59b, p. 454, the Court
stated:
"A witness is not rendered incompetent by the
fact that he was under the influence of a drug at
the time of the occurrence as to which he testifies,
or at the time of giving testimony. So, a person
who is so stupified by drugs that he does not realize until afterward what has happened is not rendered incompetent by a statute declaring persons
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incompetent as witnesses where they are insane
at the time of the happening of the events to which
they are called to testify. Further, a drug addict
may be a competent witness." (Emphasis ours.)
See also U.S. v. Fannuzzo, 174 F. 2d 177 (C.A.
2d N. Y. 1949). Brown v. U.S., 222 F. 2d 293 (C.
A. 9th, Cal. 1955) .
In the case of People v. Ortega, 2 Cal. App. 2d 884,
83 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1969), "under the guise of impeachment, the prosecution asked questions, the purpose of
which could only degrade the witness." The impeachment
was based solely on the fact that the witness was a narcotics addict. In reversing the conviction on appeal, the
court found prejudicial error in such line of questioning
based upon the lack of a showing by the prosecution that
the witness's use of drugs did in any way affect his present ability to recollect or competently testify.
It is quite obvious, then, from a reading of the case
at bar, that Jiron's allegations as to Palmer's competency
are unsupportable when one considers the detail, clarity
and extent of Palmer's testimony, coupled with the corroborating testimony of Christine Jiron, Iris Callahan,
and Mr. Duncan. It is plain to see that no prejudicial
errors were committed in prosecution of evidence and production of witnesses before the jury. The discretion of the
trial judge was validly exercised in admitting and excluding certain evidence. With the extensive jury instructions
that were given as to credibility and competency of the
witnesses, a reading of the record on appeal clearly substantiates the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons enumerated herein, respondent submits that under the facts of the case no injustice was
committed against Larry Jiron by admission of certain
evidence as to various witnesses. Certainly Jiron's brief
fails to raise incidents of reversible error which denied
him due process of law as portrayed by the record. Therefore, respondent respectfully submits that the jury verdict
and conviction in the district court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

